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TOWARD A REPRESENTATION-REINFORCING MODE
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW*
JOHN HART ELY**

Constitutional theory is in a quandary. An "interpretivist"
approach that would confine the Constitution's meaning to the
directives actually contained within its four corners proves on
analysis incapable of keeping faith with the document's promise (or
with its promises).' When we search for an external source of values
with which to fill in the Constitution's open texture, however - one
that will not simply end up constituting the Court as a counsel of
legislative revision - we search in vain. 2 Despite the frequent
assumption that those are the only options, 3 however, they are not,
for value imposition is not the only possible response to the
realization that we have a Constitution that needs filling in. A quite
different approach is available, and to discern its outlines we need
4
look no further than to the Warren Court.
* © 1978 by John Hart Ely. All rights reserved. A shorter version of this article
was delivered on April 24, 1978 at the University of Maryland School of Law as part
of the Morris Ames Soper lecture series.
** Professor of Law, Harvard University. A.B. 1960, Princeton University; LL.B.
1963, Yale University.
1. See Ely, ConstitutionalInterpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND.
L.J. 399 (1978) [hereinafter cited as ConstitutionalInterpretivism].
2. See Ely, Foreword: On DiscoveringFundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Foreword].

3. See, e.g., L. TRIBE,

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL

LAw 452-53 (1978); Sandalow,

Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162, 1184, 1193 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Sandalow]; Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double
Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 305 n.280 (1973). The claim
of Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 27 U. CHI.
L. REV. 661, 664 (1960) (emphasis added), that "choices that are made by judges in
constitutional cases always involve value consequences, thus making value choice
unavoidable" is a non sequitur.
4. "Naming" Courts after their Chief Justices is often misleading, and it can be
in this case. As regards the theme under discussion here, however, which I think
history will record as the dominant one, the nomer does not seem amiss. As is
understandable from his earlier career, Earl Warren was a thoroughgoing democrat,
who saw his role as a Justice as one of ensuring that the "in's" did not freeze others
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That Court's reputation as "activist" or interventionist is
certainly deserved. A lot of carping to the contrary notwithstanding,
however, that is where its similarity to earlier interventionist Courts,
in particular its similarity to the Court of the early twentieth century
that decided Lochner v. New York 5 and its progeny, ends. While the
commentators of the Warren era were talking about ways of
discovering fundamental values, 6 the Court itself was marching to a
different drummer. The divergence was not entirely self-conscious,
and indeed, the Court occasionally lapsed into the language of
fundamental values; it would be surprising if the thinking of earlier
Courts and the writings of the day's preeminent commentators had
not taken some toll. The toll, however, was almost entirely
rhetorical, for all the important constitutional decisions of the
Warren Court (indeed, virtually all its constitutional decisions,
important or not 7) suggest a deep structure significantly different
from the value-oriented approach favored by the academy.
Many of the Warren Court's most controversial decisions
concerned criminal procedure or other questions of what judicial or
administrative process is due before serious consequences can be
visited upon individuals - process-oriented decisions in the most
ordinary sense. But a concern with process in a broader sense with the process by which the laws that govern society are made animated its other decisions as well. Its unprecedented activism in
the fields of political expression and association obviously fits this
broader pattern. Other Courts had recognized the connection
out of either the processes or the bounty of representative government. (It really

should not surprise anybody, though it appears it often does, that Warren extended
significantly less protection to pornographic "speech" than he did to political speech
he also found distasteful.) See also Ely, The Chief, 88 HARV. L. REv. 11 (1974).
5. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).

6. See Foreword, supra note 2.
7. Of course the Warren Court, like every other, engaged in a good bit of
interpretivist application of the Constitution's more directive provisions. That is as it
should be: the objection to interpretivism is that it is incomplete, that there are clauses
it cannot handle. See Constitutional Interpretivism, supra note 1. See also United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938), quoted in text
accompanying note 15 infra. The contrast in styles to which I advert has to do with
the theories by which various courts and commentators give content to the
Constitution's more indeterminate phrases.
The apparent Warren Court candidate for a "fundamental value imposition"
characterization is Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), but on close
examination it reveals strong interpretivist urges, struggling to relate its holding to
the first, third, fourth and fifth amendments, id. at 484, making a special effort to
connect up the fourth by speculating on the methods by which the police would likely
have to enforce the law in issue. See id. at 485-86. This is all quite different from the
"method" employed in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See Ely, The Wages of Crying
Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 928-30 (1973).
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between such political activity and the proper functioning of the
democratic process; the Warren Court was the first seriously to act
upon it. That Court was also the first to move into (and once there,
seriously to occupy) the voter qualification and malapportionment
areas.8 These were certainly interventionist decisions, but the
interventionism was fueled not by a desire on the part of the Court to
vindicate particular substantive values it had determined were
important or fundamental, 9 but rather by a desire to ensure that the
political process (which is where such values are properly identified,
weighed and accommodated) was open to those of all viewpoints on
an equal basis.
Finally there were the important decisions insisting on equal
treatment for society's habitual unequals: notably racial minorities,
but also aliens, illegitimates, and poor people. But rather than
announcing that good or value X was so important or fundamental
that it simply had to be provided or protected, the Court's message
here was that insofar as political officials had chosen to provide or
protect X for some people (generally people like themselves), they
had better make sure that everyone was being similarly accommodated or be prepared to explain pretty convincingly why not.
Whether these two broad concerns of the Warren Court - clearing
the channels of political change on the one hand so that the majority
can actually rule, and correcting certain kinds of discrimination
against minorities on the other - fit together to form a coherent
theory of representative government, or whether, as is sometimes
suggested, they are actually inconsistent impulses, 0 is a question we
shall take up presently. But however that may be, it seems finally to
be coming into focus, as it did for few observers at the time," that
the pursuit of these "participational" goals of broadened access to
the processes and the payoffs of representative government, as
opposed to the more traditional and academically popular insistence
upon the provision of a series of particular substantive goods or

8. See also, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (reversing legislative
refusal to seat person elected); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (the first of

several decisions invalidating refusals to list minor party candidates on ballot); Bond
v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966) (reversing legislative refusal to seat person elected).
9. But see Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of
Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 98-99 (1966).
10. E.g., Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 283 (1957).
11. See, e.g., Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND.

L.J. 1, 6 (1971): "The man who understands the issues and nevertheless insists

upon the rightness of the Warren Court's performance ought also, if he is candid, to
admit that he is prepared to sacrifice democratic process to his own moral views."
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values deemed fundamental, was what marked the work of the
Warren Court.12 Some condemn and others praise, but at least we are
beginning t understand that something different from old-fash13
ioned value imposition was for a time the order of the day.
The Carolene Products Footnote
The Warren Court's approach was foreshadowed in a famous
footnote in United States v. CaroleneProducts Co.,

4

decided in 1938.

Justice Stone's opinion for the Court upheld a federal statute
prohibiting the interstate shipment of filled milk, on the ground that
it was rational legislation, but footnote four suggested that mere
rationality might not always be enough:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to
be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as
those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally
specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth....
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which
restricts those. political processes which can ordinarily be
expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be
subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general
12. The most sensitive commentator here has been Paul Freund. See Prefaceto P.
A. SUTHERLAND, M. HOwE & E. BROWN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at xlix (4th
ed. 1977); Freund, The Judicial Process in Civil Liberties Cases, 1975 ILL. L.F. 493
[hereinafter cited as Freund]. Compare R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY
FREUND,

58-59 (1956) with R.

DAHL, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: PROMISE AND

234 -36 (3d ed. 1967).
13. Participation itself can obviously be regarded as a value, but that does not
collapse the two modes of review I am describing into one. As I am using the terms,
value imposition refers to the designation of certain goods (rights or whatever) as so
important they must be insulated from whatever inhibition the political process might
inflict, whereas a participational orientation denotes a form of review that concerns
itself with how decisions effecting value choices and distributing the resultant bounty
are made. I surely do not claim that the words have to be used thus - there is even
doubt that "participational" deserves to be recognized as a word at all - or even that
these are the meanings they would inevitably convey. I claim only that this is how I
am using them, and that so used they do not mean the same thing as each other.
If the objection is not that I have not distinguished two concepts but rather
that one might well "value" fair decision procedures for their own sake, of course it is
right: one might. And to one who insisted on that terminology, my point would be that
the "values" the Court should pursue are "participational values" of the sort I have
mentioned, since those are the "values" (1) with which our Constitution has
preeminently and most successfully concerned itself, (2) whose "imposition" is not
incompatible with, but on the contrary supportive of, the American system of
representative democracy, and (3) that courts set apart from the political process are
uniquely situated to "impose."
14. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
PERFORMANCE
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prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other
types of legislation....
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter
into the review of statutes directed at particular religious ... or
national . . . or racial minorities . . . whether prejudice against

discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry. 15
Paragraph one, of course, is pure interpretivism: it says the Court
should enforce the "specific" provisions of the Constitution. 16 That
cannot be enough, however, for there are provisions in the
Constitution that call for more. 17 Paragraphs two and three give us a
version of what that more might be. Paragraph two suggests it is an
appropriate function of the Court to keep the machinery of
majoritarian democracy running as it should, to make sure the
channels of political participation and communication are kept open.
Paragraph three suggests that the Court should also concern itself
with what majorities do to minorities, particularly mentioning
invidiously motivated statutes and even the possibility that the
political insularity of the disadvantaged group might call for special
scrutiny.
For all its notoriety and influence, the Carolene Products
footnote has not been adequately elaborated. Paragraph one has
always seemed to some commentators not quite to go with the other
two. 18 Professor Lusky (who has never made a secret of the fact that
as a law clerk he worked on this footnote) has recently revealed that
paragraph one was added in order to secure the concurrence of Chief
Justice Hughes.' 9 The implied substantive criticism seems misplaced: positive law has its claims, even when it does not fit some
grander theory. 20 It is true, though, that paragraphs two and three
are more interesting, and it is the relationship between those
paragraphs that has not been adequately elaborated. Majoritarian15. Id. at 152-53 n.4 (citations omitted).
16. Reference to the "specific prohibitions" of the "first ten [sic] amendments"
was obviously inadvertent.
17. ConstitutionalInterpretivism, supra note 1, at 424-45.
18. E.g., Braden, The Search for Objectivity in ConstitutionalLaw, 57 YALE L.J.
571, 580 n.28 (1948).
19. L. LuSKY, By WHAT RIGHT? 110-11 (1975) [hereinafter cited as L. LuSKY].
20. The footnote purports to catalogue the occasions on which intensive judicial
scrutiny is appropriate. It would therefore be incomplete without paragraph one.
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ism and egalitarianism are surely both ancient American ideals;
indeed, dictionary definitions of "democracy" tend to incorporate
both thoughts. 21 But frequent conjunction is not the same thing as
consistency, and at least on the surface a principle of majoritarianism suggests rather directly an ability on the part of a majority
simply to outvote a minority and thus deprive its members of goods
they desire. Borrowing Paul Freund's word, 22 I have suggested that
both Carolene Products themes are concerned with participation:
they ask us to focus not on whether this or that substantive value is
unusually important or fundamental, but rather on whether the
opportunity to participate either in the political processes by which
values are appropriately identified and accommodated, or in the
accommodation those processes have reached, has been unduly
constricted. But the fact that two concepts can fit under the same
verbal umbrella is not enough to render them consistent either, and
a system of equal participation in the process of government is by no
means self-evidently linked to a system of presumptively equal
participation in the payoffs that process generates; in many ways it
seems calculated to produce just the opposite effect. To understand
the ways in which these two sorts of participation join together in a
coherent political theory, it is necessary to focus on the American
concept of representative government.
Representative Democracy
It is a principle of general application that the exercise of
granted power to act in behalf of others involves the assumption
toward them of a duty to exercise the power in their interest and
behalf ....
We think that the Railway Labor Act imposes upon the
statutory representative of a craft at least as exacting a duty to
protect equally the interests of the members of the craft as the
Constitution imposes upon a legislature to give equal protection
to the interests of those for whom it legislates.
-

United States Supreme Court (1944)23

Rhetoric prevalent before the Revolution stressed the continuing
conflict between the interests of "the rulers" on the one hand, and
the interests of "the ruled" or "the people" on the other. 24 The
21. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE

375 (2d College ed. 1976).
22. Freund, supra note 12, at 494.
23. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944).
24. See, e.g., G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at
18, 58-63, 447 (1969) [hereinafter cited as G. WOOD]; Buel, Democracy and the
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concept of "representation," indicating an association of the
interests of the rulers and ruled, was thought to contain an answer.
Thus the 2representatives
in the new government were visualized as
"citizens" 5 - ideally persons of unusual ability and character, but
nonetheless "of' the people. Upon conclusion of their service, the
vision continued, they would return to the body of the people and
thus to the body of the ruled. In addition, even while in office, the
idea was that they would live under the regime of the laws they
passed and not exempt themselves from their operation; this
obligation to include themselves among the ruled would ensure a
26
community of interest and guard against oppressive legislation.
The framers realized that even visions need enforcement mechanisms: "some force to oppose the insidious tendency of power to
separate... the rulers from the ruled" was obviously required. 27 The
principal force they envisioned was the ballot: the people in their
self-interest would choose representatives whose interests intertwined with theirs and by the critical reelection decision ensure that
they stayed that way, in particular that they did not exempt
2S
themselves from the law's demands.
In fact, as our history has borne out, that is not a bad way at all
of protecting the interests of most citizens (though of course it is not
perfect either). If a majority of us feel we are being subjected to
unreasonable treatment by our representatives, we can turn them

American Revolution: A Frame of Reference, 21 WM. & MARY Q. 165, 168 (3d ser. 1964)
[hereinafter cited as Buel]; Nelson, Changing Conceptions of Judicial Review: The
Evolution of ConstitutionalTheory in the States, 1790-1860, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 1166,
1172, 1177 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Nelson].
25. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison) 133 (B. Wright ed. 1961) ("The
two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the
delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by
the rest ....").
26. See, e.g., A. De TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 233 (Anchor ed. 1969);
L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 29 (1969) (quoting John
Locke); JAMES MILL, AN ESSAY ON GOVERNMENT, ch. VII (1825), reprintedin Essays
on Government, Jurisprudence,Liberty of the Press, & Law of Nations in REPRINTS
OF ECONOMICS CLASSICS 17-20

(1967);

J. POLE, THE PURSUIT OF EQUALITY IN

AMERICAN HISTORY 283 (1978) [hereinafter cited as J. POLE]; G. WOOD, supra note 24,
at 25, 28, 56, 231, 379. See also VA. BILL OF RIGHTS OF 1776, § 5:

That the legislative and executive powers of the state should be separate
and distinct from the judiciary; and that the members of the two first may be
restrained from oppression, by feeling and participating [in] the burthens of

the people, they should, at fixed periods, be reduced to a private station, return
into that body from which they were originally taken ....
27. Buel, supra note 24, at 184.
28. See id. at 183-85; G. WOOD, supra note 24, at 447.
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out of office. 29 What the system, at least as described thus far, does
not ensure is the effective protection of minorities whose interests
differ from the interests of most of the rest of us. For if it is not the
"many" who are being treated unreasonably but rather only some
minority, that obviously will not be so comfortably amenable to
political correction. Quite the contrary, there may be political
pressures to encourage our representatives to pass laws that treat
the majority coalition on whose continued support they depend in
one way, and one or more minorities they feel they do not need in a
less favorable way; the fact that the representatives personally must
be treated as the majority is treated is obviously no guarantee
against that.
There are those who argue that that is precisely the way
democracy is supposed to work, that minorities that do not like what
is being done to them should simply get busy bargaining, and
combine with other groups into what amount to mutual defense
pacts. 30 It would probably be a mistake, however, to attribute that
view to the founders of our nation. The "republic" they sought to
create was not one in which the government pursued the interests of
a privileged few or even only the interests of those groups that could
work themselves into some majority coalition, but rather one in
which the majority would govern in the interest of the whole
people.3 1 Thus every citizen was entitled to equivalent respect, and
equality was an oft-mentioned republican concern. (To cite the most
prominent example, its place in the Declaration of Independence
could hardly be more prominent. 32) When it came to describing the
actual mechanics of republican government in the Constitution,
however, this concern for equality got what in retrospect must seem
comparatively short shrift. This was probably because of an
assumption of "pure" republican political and social theory that we
29. Actually, whether or not our representatives treat themselves as they treat us
is probably not the critical point. If most of us are being treated in what we regard as

reasonable ways, we probably will not become overly exercised about the special
privileges of office (though it is comforting to know we can do something about them
if they grow excessive). If, on the other hand, most of us are being subjected to
regulation we find objectionable, we retain the ability - entirely irrespective of
whether our representatives are formally or informally insulating themselves - to
vote them out.
30. See, e.g., text accompanying note 62 infra.
31. See THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (J. Madison) 280-81 (B. Wright ed. 1961);
ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS 139 (Modern Library ed. 1943); J. POLE, supra note 26, at 36.
32. See also 2 Del. Laws, ch. 53 (S. & J. Adams 1797); 1 N.C. Public Acts, ch. 22 (J.
Iredell ed., F.X. Martin reviser 1804); J. POLE, supra note 26, chs. 2-3; G. WOOD, supra
note 24, at vii, 70; Katz, Republicanism and the Law of Inheritancein the American
Revolutionary Era, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Katz].
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have brushed but not yet stressed, the assumption that "the people"
were an essentially homogeneous group whose interests did not vary
significantly. 33 Though most often articulated as if it were an
existing reality, this plainly was at best an ideal, and the fact that
wealth redistribution of some form - ranging from fairly extreme to
fairly modest proposals - figured in so much early republican
theorizing, 34 while doubtless partly explainable simply in terms of
the perceived desirability of such a change, also was quite clearly
related to republicanism's political theory. To the extent that
existing heterogeneity of interest was a function of wealth disparity,
redistribution would reduce it. To the extent the ideal of homogeneity
could be achieved, it would follow that legislation in the interest of
most (or in the interest of any, for that matter) would necessarily be
legislation in the interest of all, and no serious further attention to
equality of treatment would be necessary.
At least that was the theory. The key assumption here, however,
that everyone's interests are essentially identical, is obviously a
hard one for us to swallow, and in fact we know perfectly well that
many of the Founding Fathers - the name of James Madison is one
that has to come to mind - did not swallow it either.35 Thus the
document of 1789 and 1791, though at no point directly invoking the
concept of equality, did strive by at least two strategies to protect the
interests of minorities from the potentially destructive will of some
majority coalition. The more obvious one may be the "list" strategy
employed by the Bill of Rights, itemizing things that cannot be done
to anyone, at least by the federal government (though even here the
safeguards turn out to be mainly procedural 36). The original
Constitution's more pervasive strategy, however, can be loosely
styled a strategy of pluralism, one of structuring the government,
and to an extent society generally, so that a variety of voices would
be guaranteed their say and in theory no single interest group could
dominate. As Madison - pointedly eschewing the approach of
setting up an undemocratic body to keep watch over the majority's
values - put it in The FederalistNo. 51:
It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the
society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part
of the society against the injustice of the other part ....
If a
majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the
33. See generally note 24 supra.
34. See, e.g., J. POLE, supra note 26, at 117-29; Katz, supra note 32.

35. See, e.g., G. WOOD, supra note 24, at 606-07.
36. See text accompanying note 104 infra.
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minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of
providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the
community independent of the majority ... the other, by

comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of
citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the
whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The first method
prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary or selfappointed authority. This, at best, is but a precarious security;
because a power independent of the society may as well espouse
the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests of the
minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties.
The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of
the United States. 37
Though we tend to forget it, the crucial move from a confederation to
a system with a significantly stronger central government was so
conceived. Madison has been conspicuously attacked for not
understanding pluralist political theory, 38 but in fact there is reason
to suppose he understood it rather well. His theory, derived from
David Hume and spelled out at eloquent length in The Federalist,
was that although at a local level one "faction" might well have
sufficient clout to be able to tyrannize others, in the national
government no faction or interest group would constitute a majority
capable of exercising control. 39 The Constitution's various moves to
break up and counterpoise decision and enforcement authority, not
only between the national government and the states but among the
three departments of the national government as well, were of
similar design.
This "separation of powers" was obviously not instituted with
the idea that it would promote governmental efficiency. It was,
on the contrary, looked to as a bulwark against tyranny. For if
governmental power is fractionalized, if a given power can be

37. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison) 357-58 (B. Wright ed. 1961). See
generally THE FEDERALIST No. 9 (A. Hamilton) 125 (B. Wright ed. 1961); A. Lovzjoy,
REFLECTIONS ON HUMAN NATURE 37-65 (1961); H. ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 148-51

(1963) [hereinafter cited as H. ARENDT]; G. WOOD, supra note 24, at 430-67; Adair,
"That Politics May be Reduced to a Science": David Hume, James Madison, and the

Tenth Federalist, 20 HUNTINGTON LIB. Q. 343 (1957); Diamond, Democracy and The
Federalist: A Reconsiderationof the Framers'Intents,53 AM. POL. Scl. REV. 52 (1959).
38. R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956) [hereinafter cited as R.
DAHL].

39. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison) 133-36-(B. Wright ed. 1961). See also
Morgan, The American Revolution Considered as an Intellectual Movement, in PATHS
OF AMERICAN THOUGHT 11 (A. Schlesinger, Jr. & M. White eds. 1963).
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implemented only by a combination of legislative enactment,
judicial application, and executive implementation, no man or
group of men will be able to impose its unchecked will. 40
Nongovernmental power centers were protected as well, at least
partially in pursuance of the same strategy. The press and the
church were guaranteed a substantial degree of autonomy, and while
the protections extended to private property and contract were on the
face of the document significantly less stringent, 41 those institutions
at least came in for special mention.
It is a rightly renowned system, but it did not take long for us to
come to understand that from the standpoint of protecting minorities
it was not enough. For one thing, whatever genuine faith had existed
at the beginning - and we have seen it was never very deep - that
everyone's interests either were identical, or were about to be
rendered so, had plainly run its course as the republic approached its
fiftieth birthday. The early idea of significant economic redistribution had long since passed into the realm of pipedreams past.
Significant economic differences remained a reality, and the fear of
legislation hostile to the interests of the propertied and creditor
classes - which of course had materialized earlier, during the
regime of the Articles of Confederation, 4 2 and thus had importantly
inspired the constitutional devices to which we have alluded surely did not abate during the Jacksonian era, as the "many"
began genuinely to exercise political power. 43 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court summed it up thus in 1851:
[W]hen, in the exercise of proper legislative powers, general laws
are enacted, which bear or may bear on the whole community, if
they are unjust and against the spirit of the constitution, the
whole community will be interested to procure their repeal by a
voice potential. And that is the great security for just and fair
legislation.
40. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 443 (1965). See also THE FEDERALIST
Nos. 47, 48 & 51 (J. Madison). There is a curious dispute in the literature over whether
Madison really meant to rely on the move to a central government on the one hand, or
the checks and balances within that government on the other, to check tyranny. See
Morgan, Madison's Theory of Representation in the Tenth Federalist,36 J. POL. 852
(1974) and sources cited therein. Madison himself seems to have been under the
impression he was relying on both.
41. But see text accompanying note 87 infra.
42. See generally C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1936). See also, e.g., Horwitz, The Legacy of

1776 in Legal and Economic Thought, 19 J. LAW & ECON. 621, 622 (1976).
43. See generally Nelson, supra note 24.
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But when individuals are selected from the mass, and laws
are enacted affecting their property, .

.

. who is to stand up for

them, thus isolated from the mass, in injury and injustice, or44
where are they to seek relief from such acts of despotic power?
Also relevant, though to our shame it probably seemed less so, was
the persistence of the institution of slavery. So long as blacks could
conveniently be regarded as subhuman, they provided no proof that
some people were tyrannizing others. Once that assumption began to
totter - as of course it did in a significant (if belated and
insufficient) way during the period in question - another reason for
doubting that the protection of the many was necessarily the
protection of all came into focus.
Simultaneously -

and obviously partly as a result - we came to

recognize that the existing constitutional devices for protecting
minorities were simply not sufficient. No finite list of entitlements
can possibly cover all the ways majorities can tyrannize minorities,
and the informal and more formal mechanisms of pluralism cannot
always be counted on either. The fact that effective majorities can
usually be described as clusters of cooperating minorities will not be
much help when the cluster in question has sufficient power and
perceived community of interest to advantage itself at the expense of
a minority (or group of minorities) it is inclined to regard as
different, and in such situations the fact that a number of agencies
must concur, and others retain the right to squawk, is not going to
help much either. 45 If, therefore, the republican ideal of government
in the interest of the whole people was to be maintained, in an age
when faith in the republican tenet that the people and their interests
were essentially homogeneous was all but dead, a frontal assault on
the problem of majority tyranny was needed. The existing theory of
representation had to be extended so as not simply to ensure that the
representative would not sever his interests from those of a majority
of his constituency, but also to ensure that he would not sever a
majority coalition's interests from those of various minorities.
Naturally that cannot mean that groups that comprise minorities of
44. Ervine's Appeal, 16 Pa. 256, 268 (1851). (The court's answer to its own
question was that refuge should be found "in the courts.") See also De Chastellux v.
Fairchild, 15 Pa. 18, 20 (1850); text accompanying notes 64-67 infra.

45. How often such situations arise, when the assurances of pluralist theory
cannot be made to ring true, is the subject of controversy and will be pursued later in
the book (in progress) of which this article is a part. (The question is at least
potentially relevant to the question when intensive judicial scrutiny is appropriate.)
The point sufficient for the present occasion, however, is that they do arise from time

to time: the single example of the plight of the black minority throughout our history
is enough to prove that.
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the population can never be treated less favorably than the rest, but
it does preclude a refusal to represent them, the denial to minorities
of what Professor Dworkin has called "equal concern and respect in
the design and administration of the political institutions that
46
govern them."
Of course there is an ethical ideal at work here, that it is morally
wrong to leave the welfare of certain people out of account in
formulating public policy, or to treat them worse than others without
sufficient reason for making a distinction. 47 But the ideal also serves
to ensure that representatives will represent all the people they are
elected to represent, and not simply those whose support is needed to
return them to office. Concurring in Railway Express Agency, Inc. v.
New York, 48 Justice Jackson put it well:
I regard it as salutary doctrine that cities, states and the Federal
Government must exercise their powers so as not to discriminate
between their inhabitants except upon some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of regulation. This equality is
not merely abstract justice. The framers of the Constitution
knew, and we should not forget today, that there is no more
effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable
government than to require that the principles of law which
officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed
generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary
action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose
only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to
escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them
if larger numbers were affected. Courts can take no better
measure to assure that laws will be just than to require that laws
be equal in operation. 49
Jackson was expounding on the fourteenth amendment's Equal
Protection Clause,5° which is obviously our Constitution's most
dramatic embodiment of the frontal assault strategy. Long before
that amendment was ratified, however, the theory related by
Jackson was understood at least murkily, and functioned as a
46. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 180 (1977) (Dworkin does not
suggest, nor do I, that the specific implications of the concept for particular cases are
likely to be clear.) See also J. POLE, supra note 26, at 5.
47. "The question is not whether I treat you rudely, but whether you have ever
heard me treat anyone else better." G. SHAW, PYGMALION, Act V (1913), reprinted in
G. SHAW, PYGMALION AND OTHER PLAYS 99 (1967).

48. 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
49. Id. at 112-13 (Jackson, J., concurring).

50. You will note that he mentioned the federal government, though.
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component - at times even as a judicially enforceable component 5 l
of the concept of representative democracy that had been at the
52
core of our Constitution from the beginning.
It is ironic, but the old concept of "virtual representation" is very
close to the point here. Of course the actual term was anathema to
our forefathers,53 since it was invoked to answer their claim of
"taxation without representation." But the concept contained an
important insight that has survived in American political theory
and in fact has informed our constitutional thinking from the
beginning. The colonists' argument that it was wrong, even
"unconstitutional," to tax us when we lacked the privilege of sending
representatives to Parliament was answered on the British side by
the argument that although the colonies did not actually elect
anyone, they were "virtually represented" in Parliament. Manchester was taxed, it was pointed out, without the privilege of sending
representatives to Parliament; yet surely, the argument concluded,
no one could deny that Manchester was represented. The colonists'
answer, at least their principal one, took the form of a denial not of
the concept's general sense, but rather of its applicability to our case.
Thus Daniel Dulany, of Maryland, responded:
The security of the non-electors [of Manchester] against
oppression is that their oppression will fall also upon the electors
and the representatives. . . . The electors, who are inseparably
connected in their interests with the non-electors, may be justly
deemed to be the representatives of the non-electors ... 54
and the
members chosen, therefore, the representatives of both.
However,
there is not that intimate and inseparable relation between the
electors of Great Britain and the inhabitants of the colonies,
which must inevitably involve both in the same taxation. On the
contrary, not a single actual elector in England might be
51. See also Nelson, supra note 24, at 1180-85.
52. A huge percentage of the original document, of course, is devoted to ensuring
a republican form for the federal government. See also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 ("The
United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government .... "). On the contemporary meaning of republican form, see THE
FEDERALIST No. 39 (J. Madison) 280-81 (B. Wright ed. 1961), quoted in Constitutional
Interpretivism, supra note 1, at 409.
53. See B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
169-70 (1967) [hereinafter cited as B. BAILYN].
54. C. BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 88-89 (1922) [hereinafter
cited as C. BECKER].
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immediately affected by a taxation in America.... Even acts
oppressive and injurious to an extreme degree, might become
popular in England, from the promise or expectation that the
very measures which depressed the colonies, would give ease to
the inhabitants of Great Britain.5 5
Although the term understandably has not been revived, the
protective device of guarantying "virtual representation," by tying
the interests of those without political power to the interests of those
with it, was one that importantly influenced both the terms of our
original Constitution and its subsequent interpretation. Article IV's
Privileges and Immunities Clause was intended, and generally
interpreted, to mean that state legislatures could not by their various
regulations treat out-of-staters less favorably than they treated
locals. "It was designed to insure to a citizen of State A who ventures
into State B the same privileges which the citizens of State B
enjoy."56 Justice Washington's aberrational construction in Corfield
v. CoryeI5 7 notwithstanding, article IV conveyed no set of substantive entitlements, but "simply" the guaranty that whatever entitlements those living in a state saw fit to vote themselves would be
extended to visitors.5 8 An ethical ideal of equality is doubtless
working here, but the reason inequalities against nonresidents were
singled out for prohibition in the original Constitution is obvious:
nonresidents are a paradigmatically powerless class politically. How
then were they to be protected? Not by a set of substantive
entitlements but rather by what amounts to a system of virtual
representation: by constitutionally tying the fate of outsiders to the
fate of those who did possess political power, the framers insured
that their interests would be well looked after. The Commerce Clause
of article I, section 8 provides simply that Congress shall have the
power to regulate commerce among the several states. But early on
the Supreme Court gave this provision a self-operating dimension as
well, one growing out of an obvious need to protect the politically
powerless and proceeding by essentially the same device of

55. Id. at 88-89. See also B. BAILYN, supra note 53, at 166-68.

56. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948) (footnote omitted).
57. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230). See generally Constitutional
Interpretivism, supra note 1, at 433-34.

58. See U.S.
CONVENTION OF

plan

ARTS. OF CONFED. art. IV; 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
1787, at 112 (M. Farrand rev. ed. 1966) (Pinckney, observations on

of government)

[hereinafter

cited

as

RECORDS];

see also 2 J. STORY,
§ 1806 (T. Cooley ed.

COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

1873). The provision has generally been so interpreted and is to the present day. See,
e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973).
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guarantied virtual representation. Thus, for example, early in the
nineteenth century the Court indicated that a state could not subject
goods produced out of state to taxes it did not impose on goods
produced locally.5 9 Any tax on out-of-state goods will obviously
burden interstate commerce to a degree, but the Court did not outlaw
all such taxes or even set a ceiling on them. Instead, by constitutionally tying the interests of out-of-state manufacturers to those of local
manufacturers represented in the legislature, it provided political
insurance that the taxes would not rise to a prohibitive or even
unreasonable level.6°
The examples discussed so far involve the protection of
geographical outsiders, the literally voteless. But even the technically represented can find themselves functionally powerless and
thus in need of a sort of "virtual representation" by those more
powerful than they. Thus a need for protection akin to that of literal
outsiders can arise for groups that are not that, but find nonetheless,
with respect to one or a cluster of issues, that they are habitually
outvoted and as a result subjected to regulation or other deprivation
more onerous than that to which those who habitually prevail have
proved willing to subject themselves. 6 1 From one perspective the
claim of such groups to protection from the ruling majority is even
more compelling than that of the out-of-stater: they are, after all,
members of the community that is doing them in. From another,
however, their claim seems weaker: they do have the vote, and it
may not in the abstract seem unreasonable to expect them to wheel
and deal as the rest of us (theoretically) do, yielding on issues about
which they are comparatively indifferent and "scratching the other
guy's back" in order to get him to scratch theirs. "[N]o group that is
prepared to enter into the process and combine with others need
remain permanently and completely out of power."6 2 Perhaps not
"permanently and completely" if by that we mean forever, but
certain groups that are technically enfranchised have found
themselves for long stretches in our society in a state of persistent
inability to protect themselves, by the usual "pluralistic" give-andtake, from pervasive forms of discriminatory treatment. Such groups
might just as well be disenfranchised.

59. See Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
60. See also Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 98 S.Ct. 787, 795 n.18 (1978);
McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 45-46 n.2 (1940).
61. Compare South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros. Inc., 303 U.S.
177, 184-85 n.2 (1938) with United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152-53 n.4 (1938).
62. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 37 (1970).
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Obviously the issues adumbrated here - relating to the
conditions under which it is appropriate constitutionally to bind the
interests of the majority to those of some minority with which no felt
community of interests has naturally developed - need a good deal
more attention. 63 The point that is relevant here is that long before
the enactment of the Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court
was prepared at least under certain conditions to protect the
interests of minorities that were not literally voteless by constitutionally tying their interests to those of groups that did possess political
power - and (what is the same thing) intervening specially to
protect such interests when it appeared such a guaranty of "virtual
representation" was not being provided. In the landmark case of
McCulloch v. Maryland,64 decided in 1819, the Court invalidated a
state tax on the operations of all banks (preeminently including the
Bank of the United States) not chartered by the state legislature.
Toward the end of Chief Justice Marshall's Court opinion, there
appears a passage that seems invariably to baffle students:
This opinion does not deprive the States of any resources
which they originally possessed. It does not extend to a tax paid
by the real property of the bank, in common with the other real
property within the State, nor to a tax imposed on the interest
which the citizens of Maryland may hold in this institution, in
common with other property of the same description throughout
65
the State.
What ever did he have in mind? It cannot have been that he knew
the real estate and income taxes were in fact less burdensome, for
nothing in his opinion had indicated that the tax the Court was
invalidating was in fact disabling or even burdensome. In fact it was
at the heart of his argument that no such showing was necessary:
"the power to tax involves the power to destroy," and a little tax on
bank operations is as impermissible as a big one. Well, what about a
tax on the land on which the local branch of the Bank of the United
States sat? That too had the potential to destroy, and surely there
can be no magic in the incantation that that is not a tax on
"operations." Either tax, if it got out of hand (and there was no
indication that either had), could destroy the Bank. By now we are in

63. They shall receive it in Chapter VI of the book (in progress) of which this
article is a part. See also Ely, The Constitutionalityof Reverse Racial Discrimination,
41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 728-35 (1974).
64. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
65. Id. at 436.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 37

a position to spot the trick right away; it lies in Marshall's notation
that the real estate tax would have to be "in common with the other
real property within the State," the tax on any interest held by
citizens "in common with other property of the same description
throughout the State." The unity of interest with all Maryland
property owners thus assured by this insistence on equal treatment
would protect the Bank from that sort of destruction. Of course the
power to tax real estate or income is also potentially the power to
destroy. But people are not lemmings, and while they may agree to
disadvantage themselves somewhat in the service of some overriding social good, they are not in the habit of destroyingthemselves en
66
masse.
The tax in issue, on the operations of banks not chartered by the
state, presented a different problem. Of course the Bank of the
United States did not have a vote in the Maryland legislature, but no
corporation did. The interests of organizations generally have to be
protected by people whose interests are tied up with theirs - officers,
employees, stockholders - and in these respects there is no reason to
suppose the Bank of the United States was more impoverished than
any other organization. Thus the Bank was not voteless, at least not
voteless in any sense that other corporations are not. Yet the tax on
bank operations was invalidated, and the reason it was is quite
obvious: this was a tax exclusively on banks, indeed exclusively on
banks not chartered by the state. The Bank of the United States may
have had a "vote" as effective as that of any other single
corporation, but it was clear nonetheless that with regard to a tax on
the operations of non-state-chartered banks it would find itself in a
perpetually losing situation politically, since at best - though it
appears even this was lacking - its only allies in the Maryland
legislature on this issue would be a couple of wildcat banks. Here too
there is reason to suppose that constitutional salvation would have
been found only in a genuine guaranty of virtual representation, if,
for example, the Bank's operations were taxed only as part of a tax
67
equally affecting all business operations in Maryland.
66. See id. at 428 ("In imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon its constituents.
This is, in general, a sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation.").
See also United States v. Fresno County, 429 U.S. 452, 459-60 (1977).

67. The point of the McCulloch discussion seems to have been lost in National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), which invalidated the extension of the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to state employees. It may be that the interests of
the states qua states will not be sufficiently protected by their congressional
delegations. See id. at 841-42 n.12. But see Massachusetts v. United States, 98 S. Ct.
1153, 1161-62 (1978). It

is nonetheless true, as regards issues relating to how

strenuous the demands of the Act are to be permitted to become, that the interests of
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I certainly do not mean to suggest that McCulloch was a direct
precursor of the CaroleneProducts footnote, generally heralding the
special judicial protection of discrete and insular minorities; it is
most unlikely the Bank would have received this special solicitude
had it not been a federal instrumentality. The Court's discussion is
instructive nonetheless. It suggests by its treatment of the real estate
and income taxes the clear assumption of even that early day that
representatives could be expected to represent the entirety of their
constituencies without arbitrarily severing disfavored minorities for
comparatively unfavorable treatment. And it suggests by its
invalidation of the bank operations tax its further assumption that
at least in some situations judicial intervention becomes appropriate
when this expectation appears to have been betrayed and the
existing processes of representation seem inadequately fitted to the
protection of deserving minority interests, even minority interests
that are not voteless.
It appears more generally that as early as the early nineteenth
century, at least for some theorists and judges - I surely do not
suggest that the theme was a dominant one - developing notions of
representation were understood to include a duty on the part of
representatives "virtually" to represent the politically powerless, and
even a sometime duty on the part of constitutional courts to compel
such virtual representation by insisting that the majority tie its
interests to those of the powerless and by intervening specially when
it had not done so. The extent to which this is good history is
unimportant to my main theme, however, for whatever may have
been the case before, the fourteenth amendment quite plainly
imposes both those duties. My main point in using the examples has
been to suggest a way in which what are often characterized as two
conflicting American ideals - the protection of majority rule on the
one hand, and the protection of minorities from denials of equal
concern and respect on the other - in fact can be understood as
arising from a common set of impulses.
The remainder of the article will comprise three arguments in
favor of a participation-oriented, representation-reinforcing apstates as employers would be well represented by Senators and Congressmen
responsive to the wishes of the myriad other enterprises, generally large and mediumsized corporations, covered. In no sense did the FLSA single out state governmental
entities for especially onerous regulation, and thus there was no practical danger it

would be permitted politically to achieve a degree of onerousness that would seriously
disable

state government

operations,

independent existence." 426 U.S. at 845.

let alone threaten

their "separate

and

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 37

proach to judicial review. The first will take longer than the others
since it will necessitate a tour, albeit brisk, of the Constitution itself.
What we will learn, contrary to the standard characterization of the
Constitution as "an enduring but evolving statement of general
values," 68 is that in fact the selection and accommodation of
substantive values is left almost entirely to the political process and
that instead the document is overwhelmingly concerned, on the one
hand with procedural fairness in the resolution of individual
disputes (process writ small), and on the other with what might
capaciously be designated process writ large 69 - with ensuring
broad participation in the processes and benefits of government. An
argument by way of ejusdem generis seems particularly justified in
this case, since the constitutional provisions with respect to which
we are attempting to identify modes of supplying content, such as
the ninth amendment and the fourteenth amendment's Privileges or
Immunities Clause, seem to have been included out of a "we must
have missed something here, so let's trust the future to add what we
missed" spirit.70 On my more expansive days, therefore, I am
tempted to claim that the sort of participation-oriented mode of
review suggested here represents the ultimate interpretivism. 71
68. D. Wright, The Role of the Judiciary:From Marbury to Anderson, 60 CALIF. L.
REV. 1262, 1268 (1972). See also, e.g., Sandalow, supra note 3, at 1178, 1180; J.S.

Wright, Professor Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84

HARV.

L. REV. 769, 784 (1971).
69. The approach I shall end up recommending in fact is more thoroughgoingly
process-oriented than might be supposed even from the discussion thus far. A concern

with fairness in the distribution of governmentally generated costs and benefits
might be implemented, and indeed attempts along this line are the more common, by
attending to the resultant pattern of impact: "Who has ended up with how much of
what?" is widely assumed to be the constitutionally critical question. I shall be
arguing later in the book (in progress) of which this article is a part, however, that
such distributional questions can be intelligibly approached only via a processoriented, or what Professor Nozick has called an "historical," approach, as opposed to
what he calls a "current time slice" approach. See R. NozIcK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND
UTOPIA 153 (1974). I shall thus be suggesting that "By what process did we arrive at
this distribution?" is the relevant question in this (though only this) context. See also
Ely, The Centrality and Limits of Motivation Analysis, 5 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1155,
1160-61 (1978).
70. See ConstitutionalInterpretivism, supra note 1.
71. One might argue that the Constitution's overwhelming stress on process and
participation does not actually prove anything, that the reason so few values are
singled out by the document for special substantive protection is that the various
framers were assuming that that was unnecessary because they were assuming that
identifying fundamental values for protection was a function the Supreme Court could
be counted on to perform. This argument seems plainly fallacious. Judicial review was
not even a clearly contemplated feature of the original Constitution (although it is
certainly a bona fide feature of today's). The other critical Constitution-making period
was the Reconstruction era, and surely no one would argue that at any time prior to
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Our review will tell us something else that may be even more
relevant to the issue before us, however - that the few attempts the
various framers have made to freeze values by designating them for
special protection in the document have been ill-fated, resulting in
repeal, either officially or by interpretative pretense. Obviously this
suggests a conclusion with important implications for whether the
Court should attempt constitutionally to preserve what it takes to be
fundamental values, that that is not an appropriate constitutional
task. This, we shall see, is a point the various framers of our
Constitution throughout our history have generally appreciated.
The other two arguments are susceptible to briefer statement but
are not for that reason less important. The first is that a
participation-oriented, representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review, unlike its rival value-protecting approach, is not
inconsistent with, but on the contrary (and quite by design) entirely
supportive of, the underlying premises of the American system of
representative democracy. The second is that such an approach,
again in contradistinction to its rival, involves tasks that courts, as
experts on process and (more importantly) as political outsiders, can
sensibly claim to be better qualified and situated to perform than
political officials.
The Nature of the United States Constitution
In the United States the basic charter of the law-making
process is found in a written constitution. .

. [W]e should resist

the temptation to clutter up that document with amendments
relating to substantive matters ....

[Such attempts] involve the

obvious unwisdom of trying to solve tomorrow's problems today.
But their more insidious danger lies in the weakening effect they
would have on the moral force of the Constitution itself.
72
-Lon Fuller
Many of our colonial forebears' complaints against British rule
were phrased in "constitutional" terms. That such claims generally
encountered logical problems is understandable, since by and large
they were uneasy way stations en route to what it gradually became
apparent was the real point, a desire for independence, 73 But even
Reconstruction the Court had gotten into the business of value definition long or
clearly enough to suppose the framers were framing against the assumption that that
was its job. See Constitutional Interpretivism, supra note 1, at 417-18, 447-48.
72. Fuller, American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century, 6 J. LEGAL EDUC. 457,
457, 463-64 (1954).
73. See R. PALMER, THE AGE OF THE DEMOCRATIc REVOLUTION: The Challenge,
160-61 (1959) [hereinafter cited as R. PALMER]. See generally Greene, The Role of the
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the interim "constitutional" arguments tended to be phrased in
process terms. Seldom was the claim one of deprivation of some
treasured good or substantive right; the American colonists (at least
the white males) were among the freest and best off people in the
history of the world, and by and large they knew it. 74 "Constitutional" claims thus tended to be jurisdictional 75 - that Parliament
lacked authority, say, to regulate the colonies' "internal commerce"
- or perhaps arguments of inequality. (Claims of entitlement to "the
rights of Englishmen" had an occasional natural law flavor, but the
more common meaning was that suggested by the words, a claim for
equality of treatment with those living in England.7 6 ) Thus the
colonists' "constitutional" arguments drew on the two participational themes we have been considering - that their input into the
process by which they were governed was insufficient, and (as a
consequence) they were being denied what others were receiving.
The American version of revolution, wrote Hannah Arendt,
"actually proclaims no more than the necessity of civilized
government for all mankind; the French version . . . proclaims the
existence of rights independent of and outside the body public
"77

This theme, that justice and happiness are best assured not by
trying to define them for all time but rather by attending to the
governmental processes by which their dimensions would be
specified over time, carried over into our critical constitutional
documents. Even our foremost "natural law" statement, the
Declaration of Independence, after adverting to some admirable but
assuredly open-ended goals - made more so by substituting "the
pursuit of happiness" for the already broad Lockean reference to

Lower Houses of Assembly in Eighteenth-Century Politics, 27 J. S. HIST. 451 (1961);
Morgan, ColonialIdeas of ParliamentaryPower 1764-1766, 5 WM. & MARY Q. 311 (3d

ser. 1948).
74. See G. WOOD, supra note 24, at 3; R. PALMER, supra note 73, at 189-93, 235; J.
POLE, supra note 26, at 27. To the extent the colonists believed there was a
"conspiracy" on the part of British officials to subvert the British constitution both in
England and America and thus to reduce existing liberties, see generally B. BAILYN,
sujpra note 51, that was coupled with a faith in the virtue of the American experiment,
and thus importantly buttressed the "jurisdictional" argument for American independence.
75. See G. WOOD, supra note 24, at 352 ("By 1774 the colonists, like Jefferson,
were contending that Parliament's acts over America were void not because they were
unjust, as Otis had argued in the 1760's, but because 'the British parliament has no
right to exercise authority over us."').
76. E.g., E. MORGAN , THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC: 1763-89, at 73 (1956); J.

POLE, supra note 26, at 14-15, 22-24.
77. H. ARENDT, supra note 37, at 147.
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"property"7 8 - signals its appreciation of the critical role of
(democratic) process:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, That all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain
unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights governments are
instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed . . .79
The Constitution, less surprisingly, begins on the same note, one not
of trying to set forth some governing ideology - the values
mentioned in the Preamble could hardly be more indeterminate but rather one of ensuring a durable structure for the ongoing
resolution of policy disputes:
WE THE PEOPLE of the United States, in Order to form a more
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility,
provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare,
and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our
Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the
United States of America.
I do not suppose it will surprise anyone to be told that the body of
the original Constitution is devoted almost entirely to structure explaining who among the various actors (federal government, state
government; Congress, Executive, Judiciary) has authority to do
what, and going on to fill in a good bit of detail about how these
persons are to be selected and to conduct their business. Even
provisions that at first glance might seem primarily designed to
assure or preclude certain substantive results seem on analysis to be
principally concerned with process. Thus, for example, the provision
that treason "shall consist only in levying War against [the United
States], or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and
Comfort,sE0 appears at least in substantial measure to have been a
precursor of the first amendment, reacting to the recognition that
persons in power can disable their detractors by charging disagree-

78. See J. POLE, supra note 26, at 48, 53; Kenyon, Republicanism and Radicalism
in the American Revolution: An Old-Fashioned Interpretation,19 WM. & MARY Q.
153, 168-78 (3d ser. 1962).
79. See also Katz, The Origins of American Constitutional Thought, in 3
PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 474 (D. Fleming & B. Bailyn eds. 1969).
80. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
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titles of

seems rather plainly to have been designed to buttress the

democratic ideal that all are equals in government.8 3 The Ex Post

Facto and Bill of Attainder Clauses84 prove on analysis to be
separation of powers provisions, enjoining the legislature to act
prospectively and by general rule (just as the judiciary is implicitly
85
enjoined by article III to act retrospectively and by specific decree).
86
As interpreted by the Court, the Obligation of Contracts Clause
is more of the same, prohibiting only (retrospective) legislation
importantly altering existing contracts. Powerful arguments have

been mounted that this long-standing interpretation misconstrues
the original intent underlying the provision, that it was instead
meant as a much broader prohibition on the extent to which state
governments could (prospectively or retrospectively) control the
subjects and content of private contracts. 87 Obviously the Court is

not about to reconsider its interpretation here, but if this competing
account of the original understanding is right, and it is at least
plausible, that puts the provision - and to that limited extent what
the framers thought they were about in the entire document - in a

different light.88 Unfortunately that light is diffracted. In one sense
acceptance of the competing account would simply underscore the
point suggested earlier, that the framers may have wanted to

nurture private contract as a kind of power center that would further
diffuse decision authority in our society. That surely contains
elements of truth, but any attempt to wrap this competing
interpretation in a purely "structural" or separation-of-powers

81. See 3 RECORDS, supra note 58, at 163 (James Wilson in Pennsylvania
Convention).
82. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
83. See THE FEDERALIST No. 85 (A. Hamilton) 542 (B. Wright ed. 1961), quoted in
text accompanying note 97 infra.
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. See also U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 3, cl. 7 (limiting judgment in cases of impeachment to removal from office and
thereby precluding evasion of the Bill of Attainder Clause by labeling attainders
impeachments); Comment, The Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested
Approach to the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 YALE L.J. 330, 346 n.107 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as Legislative Specification].
85. Legislative Specification, supra note 84, at 343-48.
86. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
87. See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 332 (1827) (Marshall, C.J.,
dissenting); 1 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 352-60 (1953).
88. It would also suggest, blasphemy of blasphemies, that Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905) and its progeny might have been susceptible to responsible
rationalization in interpretivist terms, though of course it would not begin to
legitimize the jurisprudence actually employed in those cases.
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explanation would be procrustean. In fact, no matter how we
interpret the clause, the fact remains that contract was singled out
for special mention, and on that basis alone we cannot responsibly
exclude the conclusion that the ability to arrive at binding private
agreements seemed to the framers a substantive value deserving
special constitutional protection from the state legislative process,
even though a sensitive commentator would mix that account with
strong elements of the "competing power centers" strategy.
It should not surprise us to find a provision with respect to
which concerns of both process and value seem to have been
intertwined, and surely this is not the only one. Nor should it trouble
us greatly; my claim is only that the original Constitution was
principally, indeed I would say overwhelmingly, dedicated to
concerns of process and structure and not to the identification and
preservation of specific substantive values. Any claim that it was
exclusively so conceived would be ridiculous (as would any
comparable claim about any comparably complicated human
undertaking). In fact there are provisions in the original document
that seem almost entirely value-oriented, though my point, of course,
is that they are few and far between. "Corruption of blood" is
forbidden as a punishment for treason.8 9 Punishing a person's
children for what the parent did is here outlawed as a substantively
unfair outcome: it just cannot be done, irrespective of procedures and
also irrespective of whether it is done to all offenders. The federal
government, along with the states, is precluded from taxing articles
exported from any state. 90 Here too an outcome is simply precluded;
what might be styled a value, the economic value of free trade
among the states, is protected. 9 1 That, however, is about it - save
one. And a big one it was. For although an understandable
squeamishness kept the word out of the document, it is clear that
slavery must be counted a value to which the original Constitution
meant to extend unusual protection from the ordinary legislative
process, at least temporarily. Prior to 1808, Congress was forbidden

89. U.S. CONST. art. III,

§ 3, cl. 2.

90. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5; U.S. CONST. art. I,

§ 10, cl. 2.

91. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 6. This obviously benefited the commercial
interests of the North, just as the protection of slavery benefited Southern interests.
See P. CARROLL & D. NOBEL, THE FREE AND THE UNFREE 132 (1977).
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to prohibit the slave trade into any state that wanted it,92 and the
93
states were obliged to return escaping slaves to their "homes.
The idea of a bill of rights was not even brought up until close to
the end of the Constitutional Convention, at which time it was
rejected. The reason seems entirely obvious, and it obviously is not
that the framers were unconcerned with liberty. The point, instead,
is that by their lights a bill of rights did not belong in a
''constitution."
[The new Constitution] was not concerned with rights, but with
functions and interests, with obtaining a judicious balance
between the effectiveness of political power exercised by a
central system and the distribution of that power that would
forever prevent the system from becoming tyrannical. 94
As Hamilton explained in The FederalistNo. 84, "a minute detail of
particular rights is certainly far less applicable to a Constitution like
that under consideration, which is merely intended to regulate the
general political interests of the nation . . . ."95 Moreover, the very
point of all that had been wrought had been, in large measure, to
preserve the liberties of individuals. "The truth is, after all the
declamations we have heard, that the Constitution is itself, in every
96
rational sense, and to every useful purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS."
The additional securities to republican government, to
liberty, and to property, to be derived from the adoption of the
plan under consideration, consist chiefly in the restraints which
the preservation of the Union will impose on local factions...
in the prevention of extensive military establishments ... in the

express guarantee of a republican form of government to each

92. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. Technically this is a federalism provision, since
the states were left free to prohibit the importation of slaves. Since the authority was

so pointedly excluded from what would otherwise have been the sweep of federal
power, however, it seems fair to read the clause as what history teaches it was, an
attempt to forestall a certain substantive result, the abolition of slavery in the South. I
am not prepared to go to the mat on this point, however, since disagreement here is
only further agreement with my overall thesis.
93. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. See also R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 151-52
(1975); P. PALUDAN, A COVENANT WITH DEATH 3-4 (1975).
94. J. PoLE, FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE: 1763-1815, at 196
(1972). See also, e.g., J. GOEBEL, ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS To 1801, 1 HISTORY
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 249 (1971).
95. THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (A. Hamilton) 534 (B. Wright ed. 1961).

96. Id. at 536.
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[state]; in the absolute and universal exclusion of titles of
nobility . . .97
A number of the state ratifying conventions were not convinced,
of course, and a bill of rights did emerge. "Aha," you are saying,
"there's a list of values if ever I saw one." "Stick around," say I,
displaying my self-confidence by suggesting we begin at the
beginning. The expression-related provisions of the first amendment
- "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances" - were centrally intended to help make our governmental
processes work, to ensure the open and informed discussion of
questions of which values should be vindicated at the expense of
which others, and to check our government when it gets out of
bounds. 98 We can attribute other functions to freedom of expression,
but the exercise has the distinct smell of the lamp about it: the view
that free expression per se, without regard to what it means to the
process of government, is the right we should protect above all
others has a highly elitist cast. Of course positive law has its claims,
and I am not suggesting that such other purposes as are plausibly
attributable to the language should not be attributed: the amendment's language is not limited to political speech, and it should not
be so limited by construction (even assuming someone could come up
with a determinate definition of "political"). 99 But we are presently
engaged in an exploration of what sort of document the framers
thought they were putting together, and in that regard the linking of
the politically oriented protections of speech, press, assembly and
petition is highly informative.
The first amendment's religious clauses - "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof" - are a somewhat different matter. As we have
mentioned, the Free Exercise Clause undoubtedly exists in part to
preserve the church as an additional power center.100 The Establish97. THE

No. 85 (A. Hamilton) 542 (B. Wright ed. 1961). See also THE
No. 9 (A. Hamilton) 125 (B. Wright ed. 1961).
98. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring,
characterizing views of Holmes, J.); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937).
See also Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 521.
99. Whether clearly nonpolitical speech should be protected under the open-ended
language of the fourteenth amendment is a different question, however. See generally
Constitutional Interpretivism, supra note 1, at 427-33.
100. One might also attempt otherwise to style the Free Exercise Clause a processprotecting provision by arguing that only total freedom of thought, even on
FEDERALIST

FEDERALIST
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ment Clause is there to maintain its separation, to keep organized
religion from exercising too much influence on government (and vice
versa). 1 1 Together, therefore, they perform a sort of separation of
powers function, seeking to maintain in the church an extragovernmental center of influence. But again one must take care not to infer
that because an account one finds congenial fits the data it must
follow that that is the only appropriate account, and here the
obvious cannot be blinked: that at least part of the explanation of
the Free Exercise Clause has to be that for the framers religion was
an important substantive value they wanted significantly to put
beyond the reach of the federal legislature.
The second amendment, protecting "the right of the people to
keep and bear Arms," seems (at least if that is all you read)
calculated simply to set beyond legislative control another "important" value, the right to carry a gun. It has not been construed that
way, however, and instead has been interpreted essentially as a
federalism provision, protecting the right of state governments to
keep militias (National Guards) and to arm them. The rationalization for this narrow construction has been historical, that the
purpose the framers talked most about was maintaining state
militias to protect the states from attack and so forth. 10 2 This
argument should not succeed, however. A provision cannot responsibly be restricted to less than its language indicates simply because a
particular purpose received more attention than others, and in fact
that favored purpose of today's firearms enthusiasts, the right of
individual self-protection, was mentioned more than a couple of
times. Arguments can be right for the wrong reasons, though, and
this one appears to be. The second amendment, in this unique
among constitutional provisions, has its own little preamble: "A well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."
Thus here, as nowhere else, the framers and ratifiers apparently
opted against leaving to the future the attribution of purposes,

nonpolitical subjects, and an ability to "do one's own thing" can guarantee that one
will be an effective participant in the democratic process. This makes sense as regards
freedom of thought (though it provides no account of why religious thoughts were here
singled out) but as regards actions it obviously proves too much, implying if followed
through an inability on the part of legislatures to regulate conduct.
101. See also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (prohibiting religious tests for public office).
102. The "so forth" talked about included a too powerful federal government, but it
seems fair to ignore that for interpretive purposes, in light (inter alia) of art. I, § 8, cl.
15, which provides for the federalization of the militias.
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choosing instead explicitly to legislate the goal in terms of which the
03
provision was to be interpreted.
The third amendment, undoubtedly another of your favorites,
forbids the nonconsensual peacetime quartering of troops. Like the
Establishment of Religion Clause, it grew largely out of fear of an
undue influence, this time by the military; in that aspect it can be
counted a separation of powers provision. Again, however, one
cannot responsibly stop there. Other provisions provide for civilian
control of the military, and although that is surely one of the
purposes here, there is obviously something else at stake, a desire to
protect the privacy of the home from prying government eyes (to say
nothing of the annoyance of uninvited guests). Both process and
value seem to be involved here.
Amendments four through eight tend to become relevant only
during lawsuits, and we tend therefore to think of them as
procedural - instrumental provisions calculated to enhance the
fairness and efficiency of the litigation process. That is exactly what
most of them are: the importance of the guaranties of grand juries,
criminal and civil petit juries, information of the charge, the right of
confrontation, compulsory process, and even the assistance of
counsel inheres mainly in their tendency to ensure a reliable factual
determination. 10 4 Unconcerned with the substance of government
regulation, they refer instead to the ways in which regulations will
be enforced against those they cover. Once again, however, that is
not the whole story. The fifth amendment's privilege against selfincrimination surely has a lot to do with wanting to find the truth:
coerced confessions are less likely to be reliable. But at least as
interpreted, 10 5 the privilege needs further rationalization than that:
there is simply something immoral, the argument runs (though it
has proved tricky pinning down exactly what it is), about the state's
103. "Militias" in colonial times were anything but highly organized groups, a fact

that would seriously undercut the received construction were it not for the
amendment's use of the phrase "well regulated."
104. See Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion
in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299, 1317-18 (1977). Of course things are seldom
unifunctional, and noninstrumental significance can also be attributed to most of
these provisions. See, e.g., Fletcher, The Individualizationof Excusing Conditions, 47
S. CAL. L. REV. 1269, 1308 (1974); Tribe, Trial by Mathematics:Precisionand Ritual in
the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1391-92 (1971). Such additional
significance should probably figure in a determination whether one or another of
these provisions should be construed to cover a given borderline case. The exercise in
which we are presently engaged, however, is one of seeking generally to characterize
the nature of the document the framers thought they were writing, which should lead
us to concentrate on the obvious central thrusts where they are identifiable.
105. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
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asking a person whether he committed a crime and expecting him to
answer. The same amendment's guaranty against double jeopardy
gets complicated. Insofar as it forbids retrial after acquittal, it seems
a largely procedural protection, designed to guard against the
conviction of innocent persons. But insofar as it forbids additional
prosecution after conviction or added punishment after sentence, it
performs the quite different (and substantive) function, which
obviously is present in the acquittal situation too, of guarantying a
sense of repose, an assurance that at some definable point the
106
defendant can assume the ordeal is over, its consequences known.
The Just Compensation Clause seems somewhat out of place in the
fifth amendment. Guarantying that the government will pay you a
fair price if it takes your property, it obviously makes a move (albeit
quite limited) in the direction of securing private property as a power
center alternative to government. As elsewhere, however, this power
center rationale must be tempered with the realization that a
substantive judgment probably was involved as well - here to the
effect that private property is a value important enough to be
insulated, at least against the risk of uncompensated confiscation.
The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
The provision most often becomes relevant when a criminal
defendant tries to suppress evidence seized as the fruit of an illegal
search or arrest, but it would be an obvious mistake to conclude from
that that it is a purely procedural provision. In fact (as thus enforced
by the exclusionary rule) it thwarts the procedural goal of accurately
determining the facts, in order to serve one or more other goals felt to
be more important. 0 7 The standard line is that that other, more
important goal is privacy, and surely there is something to that
account. Two important qualifications are in order, however. The
first is that to the extent the framers were concerned here with the
privacy of the home (and it is that image that seems to be invoked
most frequently), that concern to a significant extent is a "process"
106. See Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 726 (1974).
107. See id. at 724-26, 739-40; Monaghan, Forward: Constitutional Common Law,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975).
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concern, protecting yet another center of influence separate from
government. The second is that when the provision is considered in
its entirety, the notion of "privacy" proves inadequate to account for
it. The amendment covers seizures of goods and arrests ("seizures of
the person") along with searches, and in addition does not
distinguish public episodes from private: a completely open arrest or
seizure of goods is as illegal as a search of a private area if it is
effected without probable cause. It thus "protects individual privacy
against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, but its protections
108
go further, and often have nothing to do with privacy at all."'
Some commentators have attempted to explain the entire
amendment by noting that the right not to be searched or arrested or
to have one's property seized without probable cause is one that is
likely to have difficulty protecting itself politically. 10 9 That seems
true and to the point, but it is plainly incomplete. Many interests
that cannot protect themselves politically are not, often rightly are
not, granted constitutional protection; obviously something more is
required, something that convinces the constitution-makers the
interest in question deserves protection. We are necessarily groping
here, but what seems to me most comfortably to explain the coverage
of the fourth amendment is a realization even on the part of the
framers, though undoubtedly only partly self-conscious, that law
enforcement officers, in deciding whose lives to disrupt in hopes of
shaking out a criminal conviction - that is, whom to search or
arrest or whose goods to seize - will necessarily have a good deal of
low visibility discretion, and in addition are very likely in such
situations to be sensitive to social station and other factors that
should not bear on the decision. Thus the framers required not

108. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (footnote omitted). The Katz
Court quoted, in part, the following passage from Justice Black's dissent in Griswold:
[I]t belittles [the Fourth] Amendment to talk about it as though it protects
nothing but "privacy." To treat it that way is to give it a niggardly
interpretation, not the kind of liberal reading I think any Bill of Rights
provision should be given. The average man would very likely not have his
feelings soothed any more by having his property seized openly than by
having it seized privately and by stealth. He simply wants his property left
alone. And a person can be just as much, if not more, irritated, annoyed and
injured by an unceremonious public arrest by a policeman as he is by a
seizure in $he privacy of his office or home.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 509 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting), quoted in
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 n.4 (1967).
109. See, e.g., L. LUSKY, supra note 19, at 12, 98-99. See Michelman, The Supreme
Court and LitigationAccess Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights, 1973 DUKE L.J.
1153, 1207-09.
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simply a certain quantum of probability but also when possible, via
the warrant requirement, the judgment of a "neutral and detached
magistrate." From this perspective the fourth amendment can be
regarded as a harbinger - one of several, as we have seen - of the

Equal Protection Clause, concerned with avoiding indefensible
inequities in treatment.
The eighth amendment's ban on "cruel and unusual punishments" seems even more obviously amenable to this account.
Apparently part of the point was to outlaw certain understood and
abhorred forms of torture, 110 but the decision to use open-ended
language can hardly have been inadvertent."' It is possible that
part of the point also was to ban punishments that were unusually
severe in relation to the crimes for which they were being imposed.
But much of it surely had to do with a realization that in the context
of imposing penalties too there is tremendous potential for the
arbitrary or invidious infliction of "unusually" severe punishments
2
on persons of various classes other than "our own.""
With one important exception, the Reconstruction Amendments" 3 do not designate substantive values for protection from the
political process. 1 4 The exception, of course, involves a value we
110. See generally Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishment Inflicted": The
OriginalMeaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839 (1969).
111. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 371-73 (1910).
112. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 249-53 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
The same analysis obtains to the other clauses of the eighth amendment. That the
Court has not seriously pursued this line proves little, since it has not taken the clause
very seriously in any way.
113. The ninth amendment, of course, is one of the inscrutable provisions for
which we are seeking guides to construction, presently by exploring the nature of the
rest of the document. The tenth amendment is a federalism provision, underscoring
the reservation of non-enumerated powers to the states. The eleventh, making clear
that by itself article III does not grant federal courts jurisdiction over suits against
states, and the twelfth, making a comparatively technical change in the way the
President and Vice President were to be elected, both plainly relate to the mechanics
of government. (Even if the eleventh amendment had been intended to extend
sovereign immunity to the states, it would still seem to have been moved by a concern
for the security of the machinery of government rather than the unlikely substantive
judgment that it is preferable that costs be borne by the injured party rather than
spread among the population. In any event the better view seems to be that the
amendment was intended merely to make clear that article III did not by itself grant
federal courts jurisdiction in cases where states were defendants, not to bar Congress
from creating such jurisdiction. See Nowak, The Scope of CongressionalPower to
Create Causes of Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh
and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (1975); Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separationof Powers Issues
in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REv. 682 (1976).)
114. The fifteenth amendment provides that the vote shall not be denied on
account of race. The Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment involves
process writ small, and the Privileges or Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses,
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have mentioned before, slavery. The thirteenth amendment can
obviously be forced into a "process" mold - slaves do not participate
effectively in the political process - but that is a procrustean
description. The main point of the amendment was that slavery was
morally intolerable and for that reason was not to be countenanced
further. Thus at no point has the Constitution been neutral on this
subject. Slavery was one of the few values the original document
singled out for protection from the political branches; nonslavery is
one of the few values it singles out for protection now.
So much for our Constitution's first century. What has happened
to it in the second century of our nationhood, though ground less
frequently plowed, is most instructive on the subject of what jobs we
have learned it is suited to. There were no amendments between 1870
and 1913, but there have been eleven since. Five of them have
extended the franchise: the seventeenth extends to all of us the right
to vote for our senators directly; the twenty-fourth abolishes the poll
tax as a condition of voting in federal elections; the nineteenth
extends the vote to women, the twenty-third to residents of the
District of Columbia, and the twenty-sixth to eighteen-year-olds.
Three others (twenty, twenty-two and twenty-five) involve presidential eligibility and succession. The sixteenth, permitting a federal
income tax, adds another power to the list of those that had
previously been assigned to the central government.' 1 5 That is it,
save two, and sure enough, one of those two did place a substantive
value beyond the reach of the political process. The amendment was
the eighteenth, and the value shielded was temperance. It was, of
course, repealed fourteen years later by the twenty-first amendment,
precisely, I would argue, because such attempts to freeze substantive
values do not belong in a Constitution. In 1919 temperance obviously
seemed like a fundamental value; in 1933 it obviously did not.
What has happened to the Constitution's other value-enshrining
provisions is similar, and similarly instructive. Some surely have
survived, but typically because they are so obscure they do not
become issues (corruption of blood, quartering of troops); so
like the ninth amendment, are part of the present problem. See generally
ConstitutionalInterpretiuism, supra note 1. Sections three and four. of the fourteenth
amendment contain what can be regarded as backward-looking substantive
provisions, "punishing" the South, albeit rather mildly, by forbidding any state to
pay off a Confederate debt and denying certain political rights to Confederate leaders
unless exempted by a two-thirds vote of Congress. See also K. STAMPP, THE ERA OF
RECONSTRUCTION 1865-1877, at 143-44 (1965).
115. Moreover, the amendment most likely (though apparently not likely enough)
to become the twenty-seventh, the Equal Rights Amendment, is a guarantor of fair
distribution akin to the Equal Protection Clause: it does not designate any
substantive values as worthy of constitutional protection.
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interlaced with procedural concerns that they seem appropriate in a
constitution (self-incrimination, double jeopardy); or so uncontroversial in their generality that no one objects (interstate trade, just
compensation). Those that have been conspicuous and sufficiently
precise to be controvertible have not survived. The most dramatic
examples, of course, were slavery and prohibition. Both were
removed by repeal, in one case a repeal requiring unprecedented
carnage. Two other substantive values that at least arguably were
placed beyond the reach of the political process by the Constitution
have been "repealed" by judicial construction - the right of
individuals to bear arms, and freedom to set contract terms without
significant state regulation. Maybe, in fact, the framers never
intended to protect those values, but the fact that the Court, in the
face of what must be counted at least plausible contrary arguments,
so readily read these values out of the Constitution is itself
instructive of American expectations of a constitution. Finally, there
is the value of religion, still protected by the Free Exercise Clause.
Something different has happened here. In recent years that clause
has functioned primarily to protect what must in political terms be
counted as discrete and insular minorities, such as Amish, Seventh
Day Adventists, and Jehovah's Witnesses. Whatever the original
conception of the Free Exercise Clause, its function during
essentially all of its functional life has been one akin to the Equal
Protection Clause and thus entirely appropriate to a constitution.
Thus only rarely has our Constitution attempted to tell elected
officials what substantive values to favor or disfavor, and when it
has tried, most often the attempt has been doomed." 6 Our
Constitution by and large has remained a constitution properly so
called, concerned with constitutive questions" 7 - primarily with the
mechanics of decision, but also in important measure with whether
all the people are in fact being represented or rather some are being
unjustifiably excluded from either the process or the benefits with
116. Judicial attempts to cement fundamental values in the Constitution have for
similar reasons met similar fates. That Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393
(1857), did not prove durable is the grisliest of understatements. Neither, though not
so dramatically, did Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Even as I write, the
Supreme Court, under pressure of a public opinion its decision in Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973), did much to galvanize, is being forced to back and fill, in an
outrageously discriminatory way at that, on the subject of abortion. See Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464 (1977). See generally J. POLE, supra note 26, at 1 ("[S]elf-evident truths,
whatever the influence they may exert on mankind's opinions at particularly
impressionable moments, never succeed in commanding concentrated attention over
long periods.").
117. See 1 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 383
(1971); see also A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 30 (1975); R. DAHL, supra note
38, at 136-37.
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which the effective majority has seen fit to favor itself. What has
distinguished the American Constitution, and indeed America itself,
has been a process of government, 118 not a governing ideology." 9
"As a charter of government a constitution must prescribe legitimate
processes, not legitimate outcomes, if like ours (and unlike more
ideological documents elsewhere) it is to serve many generations
through changing times."'12
Democracy and Distrust
The first of the two remaining arguments I want to make is
entirely obvious by now, that unlike an approach geared to the
judicial imposition of "fundamental values," the participational
orientation whose contours I have sketched is not inconsistent with,
but on the contrary entirely supportive of, the American system of
representative democracy. It recognizes the unacceptability of the
claim that appointed and life-tenured judges are better reflectors of
conventional values than elected representatives,1 2' devoting itself
instead to policing the mechanisms by which the system seeks to
ensure that our elected representatives will actually represent. There
may be an illusion of circularity; the approach desribed here is more
consistent with representative democracy largely because that is the
way it was planned. But of course it is not any more circular than
setting out to build an airplane and ending up with something that
flies.
The final point worth serious mention 22 is that (again unlike a
fundamental values approach) a participational orientation assigns
118. See Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 225 (1975). See

also Dixon, The "New" Substantive Due Process and the Democratic Ethic: A
Prolegomenon, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 78; Kommers, Abortion and Constitution:

United States and West Germany, 25 AM. J. COMp. L. 255, 280 (1977):
A more plausible explanation for the German decision is to be found in
certain normative aspects of the Basic Law. The Constitution might be said to
be normative in the sense that it protects certain kinds of values and
community interests....
...American constitutionalism fails to incorporate a specific notion of
the common good or a concept of authority responsible for directing men
toward goodness.
119. I suppose if one were pressed to identify "the American ideology," laissezfaire capitalism would be the most likely candidate. This obviously is a value today's
fundamental values theorists shrink from recognizing, lest, inter alia, Lochner turn
out to have been right.
120. Linde, supra note 118, at 254.
121. See also Foreword, supra note 2.
122. For reasons that are currently obscure, I went through a period of worrying
that a Carolene Products orientation might mean less protection for civil liberties. (Of
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judges a role they are conspicuously well situated to fulfill. My
reference here is not principally to expertise. Lawyers are experts on
process writ small, the processes by which facts are found and
contending parties are allowed to present their claims. And to a
degree they are experts on process writ larger, the processes by
which issues of public policy are fairly determined; lawyers really do
have a feel, indeed it is hard to see what other special value they
have, for ways of insuring that everyone gets his fair say. But too
much should not be made of this point. Others, particularly the fulltime participants, can also claim expertise on how the political
process allocates voice and power, and in any event most legislators
are lawyers themselves. So the point is not so much one of expertise
as it is one of perspective.
The approach to constitutional adjudication recommended here
is akin to what might be called an "antitrust" as opposed to a
"regulatory" approach to economic affairs 123 - rather than dictate
substantive results it intervenes only when the "market," in our case
the political market, is malfunctioning. (A referee analogy is also not
far off: the referee is to intervene only when one team is gaining
unfair advantage, not because the "wrong" team has scored.) Our
government cannot fairly be said to be "malfunctioning" simply
because it sometimes generates outcomes with which we disagree,
however strongly (and claims that it is reaching results with which
"the people" really disagree -

or would if they "understood" -

are

likely to be little more than self-deluding projections). In a
representative democracy, value determinations are to be made by
our elected representatives, and if in fact most of us disapprove we
can kick them out of office. Malfunction occurs whenever the process
cannot be trusted, whenever: (1) the in's are choking off the channels
of political change to ensure they will stay in and the out's will stay
out, or (2) though no one is actually denied a voice or a vote, an
effective majority, with the necessary and understandable cooperation of its representatives, is systematically advantaging itself at the
course it would deny the opportunity to create rights out of a whole cloth; that is its
point and strength. What I had in mind was the possibility that the same freedoms
might systematically come out thinner if derived from a participational orientation
than they would if protected on the ground that they are "good.") Reflection has
convinced me that just the opposite is true, that freedoms are more secure to the extent
they find foundation in the theory that supports our entire government, rather than
gaining protection because the judge deciding the case thinks they are important. See
also C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 29-30 (1969).
Indeed, the only remotely systematic CaroleneProducts Court we have had was also

clearly the most protective of civil liberties. I wonder what I was thinking of.
123. See, e.g., 2 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES
INSTITUTIONS 114-15 (1971).
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expense of one or more minorities whose reciprocal support it does
not need and thereby effectively denying them the protection
afforded other groups by a representative system.
Obviously our elected representatives are the last persons we
should trust with identification of either of these situations.
Appointed judges, however, are comparative outsiders in our
governmental system: they are largely removed from the political
hurly-burly and need worry about continuance in office only very
obliquely. 124 This does not give them some special pipeline to the
genuine values of the American people; in fact it goes far to ensure
they will not have one. It does, however, put them in a position
objectively to assess claims - though no one could suppose it will
not be full of judgment calls - that either by clogging the channels
of change or by acting as accessories to simple majority tyranny, our
elected representatives in fact are not representing the interests of
those that the system presumes and presupposes they are.
Before embarking on his career-long quest for a satisfactory
approach to constitutional adjudication, 1 25 Alexander Bickel described the challenge thus:
The search must be for a function ... which is peculiarly suited

to the capabilities of the courts; which will not likely be
performed elsewhere if the courts do not assume it; which can be
so exercised as to be acceptable in a society that generally
shares Judge Hand's satisfaction in a "sense of common
venture"; which will be effective when needed; and whose
discharge by the courts will not lower the quality of the other,
departments' performance by denuding them of the dignity and
1 26
burden of their own responsibility.
As quoted, it is a remarkably appropriate set of specifications, one
that fits the orientation suggested here precisely. Unfortunately, by
adding one more specification (where I have put the ellipsis) and
thereby committing himself to a value orientation - "which might
(indeed must) involve the making of policy, yet which differs from
the legislative and executive

functions"'127

-

he built in

an

inescapable contradiction and thereby ensured the failure of his
enterprise.
124. Of course I do not claim that judges are unconcerned about what the next
election will bring. The important point is that their personal fortunes are vastly less
tied up with that question than are the fortunes of those who have to stand for
reelection. (I apologize for the preposterous obviousness of this point, whose inclusion
I am aware will be incomprehensible to those who are not acquainted with the
literature in this area.)
125. See Foreword, supra note 2.
126. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS

127. Id.
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24 (1962).

